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PRESIDENT JOHN ADAMS AND FOUR CHIEF JUSTICES: AN ESSAY FOR JAMES F. SIMON
I.	INTRODUCTION

Constitutional history is a human subject dealing with human creations—ideas,
institutions, doctrines, customs, usages, and the enduring problems to which they
respond. James F. Simon, a master of historical storytelling, has never forgotten that
truth, and his readers are the luckier for it.
In a variation on Jim Simon’s trilogy examining the turbulent relationships
between a President and a Chief Justice,1 this article examines a complicated story of
judicial appointments focusing on the problems that President John Adams faced in
juggling as many as four Chief Justices in three months in 1800–1801, when the task
of naming a new Chief Justice confronted him.2 To complicate matters for him, his
need to choose came at a time when the early Supreme Court of the United States
lacked the authority and dignity that it enjoys today. This story also dramatizes the
experimental nature of the American constitutional system, and politics under that
system, in its first years. Consider, for example, the use of a sitting Chief Justice as
leader of an American diplomatic mission, or the collision of partisan politics with
the demands of administering a system of federal courts that most Americans viewed
with suspicion and uncertainty.
By focusing on John Adams rather than on John Marshall—on the appointer
rather than the appointee—this article differs from most accounts of Adams’s
eventual choice of Marshall to become the nation’s fourth (fifth?) Chief Justice. Yet
it is only when we study the appointment of Marshall to the Chief Justiceship by
reference to President Adams’s struggle with the task of naming a new Chief Justice,
by setting that struggle firmly within its historical and political contexts, that we can
understand the ordeal that Adams faced and the solution that he found to it.
II.	SETTING AND CONTEXT

The setting in which Adams wrestled with this problem was Washington, D.C.,
the new permanent federal capital. Washington was far from being the august
metropolis envisioned by its creators—it existed more in architectural drawings and
planners’ hopes than in reality. Work on the Capitol building had barely begun; only
that part of the building housing the original chamber of the House of Representatives
1.

See James F. Simon, FDR and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court, and
the Epic Battle over the New Deal (2012); James F. Simon, Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney:
Slavery, Secession, and the President’s War Powers (2006); James F. Simon, What Kind of
Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic Struggle to Create the United
States (2002).

2.

I acknowledge my profound debt to the late Kathryn Turner Preyer (1925–2005), whose 1960 article,
The Appointment of Chief Justice Marshall, was a pioneering exploration of this subject. See Kathryn
Turner, The Appointment of Chief Justice Marshall, 17 Wm. & Mary Q. 143 (1960), reprinted in
Blackstone in America: Selected Essays of Kathryn Preyer 39 (Mary Sarah Bilder, Maeva
Marcus & R. Kent Newmyer eds., 2009) [hereinafter Preyer Essays]. For a useful, distilled treatment
of the Supreme Court Judiciary before Chief Justice Marshall’s appointment, see Natalie Wexler, The
Chief Justice from a Historical Perspective: In the Beginning: The First Three Chief Justices, 154 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1373 (2006). See id. at 1379–96 for Wexler’s version of the events recounted here. See infra, text at
notes 21–23 and 36–40, for an explanation of why I speak of “as many as” four Chief Justices.
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was standing and in use. The Executive Mansion was large, cold, and drafty—First
Lady Abigail Adams hung her laundry to dry in the cavernous East Room. Visitors
from European nations viewed with derision the infant capital of a fragile federal
republic, with its gargantuan public buildings and building sites speckling a wilderness,
linked only by muddy footpaths instead of clean, dry, paved roads.3 Though seemingly
desolate, the capital was far from quiet. Politicians were wrangling bitterly over a host
of issues, including, but by no means limited to, those thrown up by the elections of
1800 and the bitter, vituperative campaign that had preceded them.
In December 1800, President John Adams was sitting in the metaphorical eye of
this political hurricane—a lame-duck and painfully self-conscious chief executive.4
Having stood for a second term as candidate (with Charles C. Pinckney of South
Carolina) of the Federalist partisan alliance, he had suffered a close but decisive
defeat at the hands of the Republican ticket of Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr.
The principal reason for his defeat was the shattering of the fragile bands holding
together two contentious and mutually suspicious groups of Federalist politicians—
moderate Federalists loyal to President Adams and more conservative Federalists
supporting former Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton. 5 The resulting
Republican victory left all the Federalists downcast, demoralized, and all too inclined
to blame one another for their plight.
The only thing resolved by the presidential election of 1800 was that John Adams
would be going home to Braintree, Massachusetts in March 1801. Who would
become President was the subject of frantic and angry politicking both in the capital
and throughout the United States. Under the original version of the Electoral
College, the mechanism specified in the Constitution for choosing the President and
the vice president every four years, electors cast two electoral votes apiece, except that
they could not vote for two people from the same state. Although the party caucuses
in Congress that selected the candidates had preferences for which should be
President and which should be vice president, the Electoral College threw all the
candidates into the same arena, vying for the same office. The candidate receiving
the greatest number of electoral votes (so long as it was a majority of the votes cast)
would become President, and the first runner-up would become vice president.6
The problem was that the Constitution’s original method of choosing the
President and vice president never made allowances for the development of loosely
3.

See generally Kenneth R. Bowling, The Creation of Washington, D.C.: The Idea and the
Location of the Nation’s Capital (1991); Kenneth R. Bowling, Creating the Federal City,
1774–1800: Potomac Fever (1988).

4.

On Adams, see Gilbert Chinard, Honest John Adams (1935); John E. Ferling, John Adams: A
Life (1992); James E. Grant, John Adams, Party of One (2005); John Adams and the Founding
of the Republic (Richard Alan Ryerson ed., 2001).

5.

On this division, see Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (1968), and Stephen G. Kurtz,
The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism 1796–1800 (Univ. Pa. Press rev. ed.
1957).

6.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. Const. amend. XII.
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organized partisan alliances operating on the national political stage.7 In 1796, this
arrangement had led to an embarrassing and uncomfortable result: the victor, John
Adams, became President, and his chief rival, Thomas Jefferson, who trailed him by
only three electoral votes, became vice president. In 1800, the contest was even more
fraught, and the results were rife with the potential for political, even constitutional,
crisis. Jefferson and Burr tied for first place, each receiving seventy-three electoral
votes to Adams’s sixty-five (and sixty-four votes cast for Pinckney). The Federalists
also lost control of both Houses of Congress to the Republicans. And yet, despite
their rout at the polls, the governmental calendar set forth in the Constitution and
federal law kept the lame-duck House of Representatives, with a fractious and
demoralized Federalist majority, in office until inauguration day, March 4, 1801,
giving it the power and responsibility to decide who would become President.
Although the balloting would not begin until February 1801, politicking over the
electoral deadlock between Jefferson and Burr was already underway.8
Meanwhile, Adams sat in the Executive Mansion, alone and lonely, wrestling
with a tangle of constitutional, political, administrative, diplomatic, and national
security problems facing the nation in the closing months of his presidency. One
such issue was the struggle by Congress to frame new legislation reworking the
federal judiciary, responding to over a decade of lobbying by the Justices of the
Supreme Court and to the changed political context created by the results of the
1800 elections—but many other unresolved problems confronted the federal
government, leaving Adams with a desk piled high with correspondence to review
and decisions to make.
III.	ADAMS AND CHIEF JUSTICE ELLSWORTH

Above all other matters, Adams was awaiting news from a diplomatic mission,
led by Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth, seeking an end to the nation’s undeclared
naval war with France—a war that had resulted from a series of diplomatic clashes
dating from the earliest months of Adams’s presidency, had generated domestic
7.

On the unsatisfactory original version of the electoral college, see R.B. Bernstein, The Constitution as an
Exploding Cigar and Other “Historian’s Heresies” About a Constitutional Orthodoxy, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
1073, 1088–89 & nn.67–72 (2010–2011).

8.

For the best account of this traumatic election, see Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National
Politics in the New Republic 199–261 (2001). See also Susan Dunn, Jefferson’s Second
Revolution: The Election Crisis of 1800 and the Triumph of Republicanism (2004); John
Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800 (2004); Edward J. Larson, A
Magnificent Catastrophe: The Tumultuous Election of 1800, America’s First Presidential
Campaign (2007); Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood
80–108 (2000); The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, and the New Republic (James
Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2002); Bernard A. Weisberger, America Afire:
Jefferson, Adams, and the Revolutionary Election of 1800 (2000). Older works include Daniel
Sisson, The American Revolution of 1800 (1974); Frank van der Linden, The Turning Point:
Jefferson’s Battle for the Presidency (Fulcrum Publ’g 2000) (1962). The latest addition to the
literature as of this writing is James Roger Sharp, The Deadlocked Election of 1800: Jefferson,
Burr, and the Union in the Balance (2010).
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controversies that bedeviled Adams’s administration, and ultimately had contributed
to Adams’s defeat in 1800.9
Though the choice of a sitting Chief Justice to conduct a diplomatic mission
might cause modern Americans to raise their eyebrows, Adams had followed
precedent in asking Ellsworth to lead this peace mission. In 1794, President George
Washington had asked Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain,
hoping that, as a veteran diplomat, Jay could resolve outstanding differences between
the United States and its former mother country.10 Jay’s Treaty did ease tensions
between the two nations, but at the cost of severe domestic political turbulence.
That two Chief Justices served on diplomatic missions in the 1790s reflected the
conflicting perceptions of the Supreme Court in its early years; the Justices often
were informal advisors to the executive branch, sometimes even accepting statutory
executive responsibilities (such as deciding pension claims by Revolutionary War
veterans) by designation of Congress.11 These missions also reflected the Court’s lack
of pressing business, which in turn indicated that the Supreme Court as an institution
and the Justices as individuals had at best uncertain stature in the public’s eyes.12
In the middle of December, the good news for which Adams had been waiting
finally arrived, though it came too late to save his Presidency: As reported in a letter
dated October 16, 1800, and marked by Adams as received on December 15,
Ellsworth and his colleagues had negotiated the Convention of 1800, which ended
hostilities and resolved outstanding differences between France and the United
States. In honor of this news, Adams renamed his home Peacefield; in 1815, he
declared to the Massachusetts politician James Lloyd that his epitaph should read,
9.

See Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared
War with France 1797–1801 (1966); Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, The Nationalist Ferment: The
Origin of U.S. Foreign Policy 1789–1812 (Lillian A. Parrott trans., 2004); 4 The Documentary
History of the Supreme Court of the United States 1789–1800, at 245 (Maeva Marcus et al.
eds., 1992) [hereinafter DHSC]; Wexler, supra note 2, at 1401–06.

10.

Samuel Flagg Bemis, Jay’s Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (Yale Univ. Press
1962) (1923); Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding
Fathers (1970); Todd Estes, The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of
Early American Political Culture (2006). On Jay’s mission, see Walter Stahr, John Jay:
Founding Father 313–38 (2005); 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 7; 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 243–45
(discussing Jay’s mission and its consequences); Wexler, supra note 2, at 1401–06.

11.

See, e.g., Stewart Jay, Most Humble Servants: The Advisory Role of Early Judges (1997); Ene
Sirvet & R.B. Bernstein, John Jay, Judicial Independence, and Advising Coordinate Branches, 21 J. Sup. Ct.
Hist. 23 (1996); Wexler, supra note 2, at 1396–1406. In Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792), the Court
confronted, but did not have to resolve, a conflict between circuit court decisions on a federal statute
giving the judges of the circuit court the added responsibility of administering pension claims by
Revolutionary War veterans. See Julius Goebel, Jr., Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, in 1
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States
580–86 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1971).

12.

On the early Supreme Court, see generally DHSC, supra note 9; William R. Casto, The Supreme
Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth
(1995); Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998)
[hereinafter Seriatim]; Goebel, supra note 11; Wexler, supra note 2, passim.
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“Here lies John Adams, who took upon himself the responsibility of the peace with
France in the year 1800.”13
Ellsworth’s letter brought news not just of an old set of problems solved but also
of a new problem to be solved. He informed Adams that, because of his fragile health
(specifically, the excruciating ailment that he called “the gravel,” now recognized as
kidney or bladder stones), he was resigning as Chief Justice, effective immediately:
Constantly aff licted with the gravel, and the gout in my kidnies, the
unfortunate fruit of sufferings at sea, and by a winters journey through Spain,
I am not in a condition to undertake a voyage to America at this late season
of the year; nor if I were there, would I be able to discharge my official duties.
I must therefore pray you, Sir, to accept this my resignation of the office of
Chief Justice of the United States.14

In naming a new Chief Justice, Adams would choose a successor to a man who
had been a moderately successful Chief Justice since his confirmation in 1796. As
Adams considered the choices that Ellsworth’s resignation placed before him, he
knew that the Supreme Court and its Chief Justice were of uncertain value and
dignity in the new nation’s legal and political worlds. These problems plagued the
Court when Ellsworth became Chief Justice, and they still were afflicting the Court
when Adams received Ellsworth’s resignation.
In 1796, Ellsworth became Chief Justice because of his political eminence as a
framer of the Constitution, as a leading Federalist senator from Connecticut, and as
a designer of the federal court system created by the Judiciary Act of 1789.15 Such an
appointment, from our perspective, seems natural and easy. Yet it is largely forgotten
that President Washington’s appointment of Ellsworth was his third attempt to fill
the Chief Justiceship in the space of a year.
The Court’s and President Washington’s troubles began in the spring of 1795,
when, on returning home after negotiating the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, Chief
Justice John Jay discovered that he had been elected governor of New York—a post
that he had sought in 1792 while presiding over the Court, and for which his friends
13.

Grant, supra note 4, at 383 (quoting letter from John Adams to James Lloyd (Jan. 1815), in 10 Charles
Francis Adams, The Works of John Adams, Esq., Second President of the United States 113
(1856)).

14.

Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to John Adams (Oct. 16, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 123. On the
perennial question of whether the correct title is “Chief Justice of the United States” (which seems to
have been standard since 1874, though used on occasion before 1874) or “Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court” (which seems to have been standard from 1790 through 1874, although with
variants cropping up), see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 173 n.6 and sources and authorities cited, including
Josiah M. Daniel, III, “Chief Justice of the United States”: History and Historiography of the Title, 1983 Sup.
Ct. Hist. Soc. Y.B. 109–12. I am indebted to Josiah M. Daniel, III, for this reference.

15.

On Ellsworth, see William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth and the Creation of the Federal
Republic (1997); Casto, supra note 12; and William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the
Felicity and Glory of Your Administration,” in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 292–321. For documentation of
Ellsworth’s appointment, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 120–23. For a very old treatment that still has
useful information, see 2 Henry Flanders, The Lives and Times of the Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States 55–276 (T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1881) (1875).
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had backed him without his knowledge in 1795.16 On June 28, 1795, he resigned
from the Supreme Court to accept his election. To succeed Jay, Washington first
nominated John Rutledge of South Carolina, a distinguished but fiery politician who
had been an important delegate to the Federal Convention and a leading advocate of
the Constitution in South Carolina’s 1788 ratifying convention. Rutledge also had
served brief ly as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1789 to 1791;
although he had presided over circuit courts in the Southern circuit, he never joined
his colleagues for sessions of the Supreme Court, and in 1791 he resigned to become
Chief Justice of South Carolina’s Court of Common Pleas and Sessions.17
Because Congress was in recess when Jay submitted his resignation, Washington
gave Rutledge a recess appointment, confident that the Senate would confirm him
when it reconvened later that year. Rutledge took office pursuant to that appointment
on June 30, 1795. However, the abrasive Rutledge damaged his candidacy within
three weeks of taking office by making a public speech in Charleston, South Carolina
on July 16, 1795, against ratifying the Jay Treaty. News of Rutledge’s address, and
criticism of Rutledge for making it, soon spread through the nation’s newspapers.18
Rutledge’s imprudent intervention into the ongoing political controversy over the Jay
Treaty, combined with rumors about his mental instability, sank his nomination; after
Washington submitted Rutledge’s name to the Senate on December 10, 1795, the
Senators rejected Rutledge on December 15 by a vote of fourteen to ten, the first time
that the Senate had rejected a Supreme Court nominee. Before Rutledge received
word of his rejection by the Senate, he had suffered a breakdown of his health while
performing his circuit-riding duties; distraught at this evidence that he could no
longer carry out his judicial duties, he attempted suicide by drowning at Camden,
South Carolina, on his return journey to his home, and then made another attempt
after returning home. These two attempts by Rutledge to take his own life confirmed
the contemporary rumors that he was psychologically unfit to preside over the Court.

16.

See Stahr, supra note 10, at 334–35 (discussing his election in 1795), 339–64 (discussing his
governorship). On Jay, see generally Frank Monaghan, John Jay (1937); Richard B. Morris, John
Jay, the Nation, and the Court (1967); Stahr, supra note 10, passim. For a more astringent
perspective on Jay, see Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, “Honour, Justice, and Interest” John Jay’s Republican
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 26–69. For a very old
treatment that still has useful information, see Flanders, supra note 15, at 19. For documentation of
Jay’s appointment in 1789, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 9. For discussion of Jay’s appointment, see
Stahr, supra note 10, at 271–73, and sources cited therein.

17.

On Rutledge, see James Haw, John & Edward Rutledge of South Carolina (1997); James Haw,
John Rutledge: Distinction and Declension, in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 70–96. (There is also a semifictional study that is not recommended: Richard Barry, Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina
(1942)). Also see the much older treatment in Flanders, supra note 15, at 431–645, and see the
documentation of Rutledge’s 1789 appointment in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 19–23.

18.

For documentation of this controversial speech and reactions to it, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 765–
828; George S. McCowan, Jr., Chief Justice Rutledge and the Jay Treaty, 62 S.C. Hist. Mag. 10–23
(1961).
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Still apparently unaware of his rejection by the Senate, he sent President Washington
a resignation letter on December 28, 1795.19
Trying to put the Rutledge debacle behind him, Washington next turned his
attention to the Court’s senior Associate Justice, William Cushing of Massachusetts,
who was renowned for his judicial experience and for his solid, reliable commitment
to the Federalist cause.20 Appointed by President Washington to the Court in 1789,
Cushing was a learned and respected jurist who had presided over his state’s highest
court for over a decade and had played a key role in Massachusetts’s ratification of
the Constitution in 1788 and in the state’s abolition of slavery.21 When Washington
submitted his name to the Senate, on January 26, 1796, Cushing won easy, swift,
and unanimous confirmation that same day, and Washington executed his judicial
commission as Chief Justice on January 27. Oddly enough, tradition has it that
Washington never informed Cushing of his plan to name him as the nation’s new
Chief Justice, and that somehow Cushing never learned that the Senate had
confirmed the nomination. Again according to tradition, the first news that Cushing
had of his elevation came at a state dinner at the President’s house on January 26,
when Washington announced that the new Chief Justice would sit at his right at the
dinner. Whether this tradition is true or false, after a few days of consideration,
Cushing wrote to President Washington on February 2, 1796, declining his
appointment as Chief Justice, returning his commission, and asking that he be
allowed to remain as an Associate Justice, citing his frail health as his reason for
declining his promotion. The records are unclear whether Cushing actually presided
over the Court as Chief Justice pursuant to his appointment before declining the
office; even had he presided over the Court at that time, he would have done so as
senior Associate Justice because of the vacancy in the Chief Justiceship, as he had
previously done while Chief Justice Jay was absent from the bench on his diplomatic
mission to Britain. The Cushing incident, a puzzling byway in the history of the
early Court, became yet another source of frustration for President Washington.22
19.

See Haw, supra note 17, at 70–88; see also Wexler, supra note 2, at 1383–86.

20. On Cushing, see Ross E. Davies, William Cushing, Chief Justice of the United States, 37 U. Tol. L. Rev.

597 (2006); Scott Douglas Gerber, Deconstructing William Cushing, in Seriatim, supra note 12, at
97–125 (citing—and severely criticizing—John D. Cushing, A Revolutionary Conservative: The Public
Life of William Cushing 1732–1810 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University), and
correctly reporting it to be the only extended modern treatment of its subject); Wexler, supra note 2, at
1386–89. See also the much older treatment in Flanders, supra note 15, at 11–51. For documentation
of Cushing’s appointment, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 28–30.

21.

Gerber, supra note 20, at 115–17.

22.

For documentation of Cushing’s 1796 appointment to the Chief Justiceship, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at
101–04. In the most detailed and challenging analysis, Ross Davies stresses what in later times would be
profound irregularities about Cushing’s acceptance and then rejection of his appointment as Chief Justice
accompanied by his decision to return to his duties as an Associate Justice. See Davies, supra note 20,
passim. Neither DHSC nor Gerber addresses these issues. See William Cushing: Appointment as Associate
Justice in 1789, in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 26, 27 n.19, 101–04; Gerber, supra note 20, at 98. For a
distillation of the conventional wisdom that Cushing was acting Chief Justice while Jay was in England,
that he continued in that role while the chief justiceship remained vacant, and that he thus did not
actually act as Chief Justice under his appointment to that post in January 1796, see Flanders, supra
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Thus, in naming Ellsworth Chief Justice, Washington was trying a third time to
fill the vacancy left by Jay’s resignation, and to put behind him and the nation the
embarrassments of the Rutledge recess appointment and the short-lived Cushing
appointment.
Ellsworth proved a sound choice to fill the vacant Chief Justiceship. As Chief
Justice, he led his colleagues in consolidating the work of the Court under his
predecessors, 23 and indeed Ellsworth seems to have been a key architect of the
abandonment of the Court’s original practice of seriatim written opinions in favor of
one opinion for the Court—an achievement often attributed to John Marshall. 24
Under Ellsworth’s stewardship, few cases of note came before the Justices—a
circumstance, of course, over which neither Ellsworth nor his colleagues had any
control. Four cases stand out, however, from the work of the Ellsworth Court,
suggesting that the federal judiciary was indeed justifying its existence as a part of
the federal constitutional system: Hylton v. United States (1796), in which the Justices
upheld a federal tax on carriages, noting by implication that if they had found the
statute invalid, they would have struck it down as unconstitutional;25 Hollingsworth
v. Virginia (1798), rejecting an attempt to invalidate the Eleventh Amendment
because it had not been signed by President George Washington before being sent to
the states (thereby confirming that a President has no required part to play in the
Constitution’s amending process); 26 Calder v. Bull (1798), holding that the
constitutional ban on ex post facto laws applied only to criminal and not to civil
statutes;27 and New York v. Connecticut (1799), the first lawsuit between two states
that the Court heard in its original jurisdiction. 28
Adams’s dealings with Ellsworth had been few but cordial. Ellsworth administered
the constitutional oath of office to Adams at his inaugural on March 4, 1797; thus,
Adams was the first President to be sworn in by a Chief Justice, and Ellsworth was
note 15, at 46–48. Flanders also reports the story of Washington’s announcement of Cushing’s
appointment at a state dinner. See also Wexler, supra note 2, at 1387 n.65 (citing George Van Santvoord,
Sketches of the Lives and Judicial Services of the Chief-Justices of the United States 245
n.* (1854)). Also see Wexler’s cogent and persuasive analysis in id., at 1386–89, pointing out among other
inconvenient facts that there is no evidence that Cushing was ever sworn in as Chief Justice.
23.

The best treatment of the Ellsworth Court is Casto, supra note 12. See also Seriatim, supra note 12; 3
DHSC, supra note 9 (dealing with the Justices on circuit 1795–1800); 5 DHSC, supra note 9 (discussing
suits against states); 7 DHSC, supra note 9 (dealing with cases 1796–1797); 8 DHSC, supra note 9
(dealing with cases 1798–1800); Goebel, supra note 11.

24.

For a valuable treatment of this point, see Wexler, supra note 2, at 1412–18 (discussing the tendency to
award the credit for this innovation to Marshall instead of Ellsworth). A noteworthy example of the
tendency to credit Marshall with inventing the opinion for the Court is George Lee Haskins & Herbert
A. Johnson, Foundations of Judicial Power: John Marshall, 1801–1815, in 2 The Oliver Wendell
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States 382–83 (Paul A. Freund
ed., 1981).

25.

Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).

26. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
27.

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).

28. New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. 1 (1799).
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the first Chief Justice to swear in a President. They had first met in the Senate in
1789, when Adams was the first vice president and Ellsworth was one of the first
Senators from Connecticut. In the turbulent political strife of the late 1790s, in which
the nation witnessed tense relations not only between the partisan alliances of the
Federalists and the Republicans, but internal bickering between Adams Federalists
loyal to the President and so-called High Federalists loyal to Alexander Hamilton,
Ellsworth aligned himself with the Adams Federalists, and preferred to seek
compromise and conciliation rather than engage in political brawling.29
In 1799, while Hamilton and his allies were engaged in preparing the United
States for what they both feared and hoped would be an all-out war with France,
Adams grew to distrust the motives and loyalties of his Cabinet—specifically
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering and Secretary of War James McHenry, both of
whom he suspected of being aligned with Hamilton rather than himself.30 Having
learned from the American minister resident at The Hague, William Vans Murray,
that France was making confidential overtures to seek a peaceful resolution of the
differences between the two nations and an end to the so-called “quasi-war,” Adams
secretly authorized Murray to pursue this prospect for peace.31 In February 1799, he
named Murray as American minister plenipotentiary to France—and did so without
prior consultation with his Cabinet. Angered Federalists in the Senate blocked
Murray’s nomination, leading to a confrontation between the President and key
Senators that degenerated into a shouting match. The only way to resolve the
differences between the Federalist factions was to name a mission of three diplomats.
Murray would be one. Adams wanted to name Ellsworth and Patrick Henry as the
second and third members of the team, but Henry declined, and the fallback choice
was Governor William Richardson Davie of North Carolina. Although Ellsworth
was already apprehensive about the effects of a trans-Atlantic voyage and European
travel on his health, he told President Adams to “disregard any supposed pains or
perils that might attend me from a voige at one season more than another.”32
After months of difficult and frustrating negotiations, Ellsworth, Murray, and
Davie concluded the Convention of 1800 (also known as the Treaty of Mortefontaine
for the place where the diplomats signed it). This agreement ended hostilities between
France and the United States and abrogated the Franco-American alliance of 1778,
which had been vital to the success of the Revolution, but was now more of an
29. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the Felicity and Glory of Your Administration,” supra note 15, at 311.
30. On the strife between Adams and key members of his Cabinet, which culminated in Adams forcing

Secretary of War James McHenry to resign and firing Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, see, e.g.,
Ferling, supra note 4, at 390–93. For Pickering’s perspective, see Gerald Clarfield, Timothy
Pickering and the American Republic 180–218 (1980). On the continuing acrimony between
Adams and Pickering, even after both of them had retired from active service in public life, see Freeman,
supra note 8, at 113, 132, 137, 151–52, 156–57, 280, 316, 317 n.13, 324 n.102, 325 nn.116 & 118.

31.

Peter P. Hill, William Vans Murray Federalist Diplomat: The Shaping of Peace with
France 1797–1801 (1971).

32.

Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the Felicity and Glory of Your Administration,” supra note 15, at 311
(quoting Oliver Ellsworth to John Adams on Sept. 26, 1799).
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embarrassment than an advantage to both nations. It also provided that each nation
would give the other “most favored nation” trading status (that is, that each nation
would extend to the other the most favorable terms governing commercial exchanges
granted to any other nation); provided for the return by each side to the other of
public ships captured during the quasi-war; guaranteed free passage for all goods and
passports; established more flexible arrangements in case of future hostilities between
the two nations, including the renunciation of each nation’s authority to freeze assets
owned by citizens of the other nation; recognized French fishing rights off the waters
of Newfoundland and the Gulf of St. Lawrence; and required privateers of each
nation to carry the equivalent of insurance to provide compensation for any unlawful
future damage inflicted on the other nation’s shipping.33
Thus, it was with considerable satisfaction that Ellsworth wrote home to
President Adams reporting the negotiation of this treaty, while also submitting his
resignation on the grounds of illness. As he advised Adams, the state of his health
prevented his quick return to the United States; he did not return to Connecticut
until early 1801. Thereafter, he spent his time in retirement, with one brief stint as a
member of the state’s Governor’s Council. He died in his home town of Windsor, on
November 26, 1807.34
IV. PRESIDENT ADAMS AND CHIEF JUSTICE (?) CUSHING

The timing of Ellsworth’s resignation gave Adams an opportunity, while also
posing three problems. By naming a new Chief Justice, Adams could shape the
development of the Court and the constitutional system. First, however, the
rancorous, divided Federalists in the Senate would have to confirm his nominee. Not
only did many of the Federalist Senators blame Adams for their rout at the polls—
they had long been split on almost every issue between those loyal to Hamilton and
those loyal to Adams. 35 Second, as already noted, the federal judiciary was a
constitutional orphan—lacking respect, denounced as partisan, and mocked as
unnecessary. Would the Senate deem the need to fill the vacancy created by
Ellsworth’s resignation important enough to act on with dispatch? Third, Adams
only had a few weeks to choose a nominee, lest the task of filling the Chief Justiceship
fall to the incoming Republican President (either Jefferson or Burr)—a prospect that
33.

Convention Between the French Republic and the United States of America, U.S.-Fr., Sept. 30, 1800,
8 Stat. 178 (1778–1845). To view the text of the Convention of 1800, see 2 Treaties and Other
International Acts of the United States of America: Documents 1–40, 1776–1818, at 457–87
(Hunter Miller ed., 1931) (including both French and English texts); 7 Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949: Denmark–France
801–11 (Charles L. Bevans ed., 1971) (providing the English-language text only); France—Convention
of 1800: Text of the Treaty, The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/fr1800.asp
(last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (providing the English-language text based on the Hunter Miller version).
On the mission generally, see Stephen G. Kurtz, The French Mission of 1799–1800: Concluding Chapter in
the Statecraft of John Adams, 80 Pol. Sci. Q. 543 (1965).

34. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth: “I Have Sought the Felicity and Glory of Your Administration,” supra note 15, at

312–15; 2 Flanders, supra note 15, at 264–76.

35.

Dauer, supra note 5, passim; Kurtz, supra note 5, passim.
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both President Adams and the Senate’s Federalist majority viewed with alarm,
however much they might have disagreed on other matters.
One way to avoid a confirmation battle would be to promote a sitting Associate
Justice to preside over the Court. If Adams were to choose a sitting Justice to take
Ellsworth’s place, Cushing, the Court’s senior Justice, had the inside track—even
though, as noted above, Cushing had turned down appointment to the Chief
Justiceship in 1796 and none of the reasons that he had cited for doing so had
changed in the ensuing four years. As 1800 faded into 1801, Cushing still suffered
from all the debilities that he had cited to President Washington to explain his
refusal of the Chief Justiceship: he was elderly (at sixty-eight, three years older than
Adams himself) and of frail and failing health. Although Adams was aware that
many Federalists expected him to name Cushing to succeed Ellsworth, the President
doubted whether the elderly, fragile jurist could stand the stress of leading the Court
or whether, after a few years, he would die or resign, leaving a vacancy to be filled by
a Republican President.36
The Associate Justice next in seniority, William Paterson of New Jersey, was
another often-mentioned candidate for the Chief Justiceship. Like Ellsworth,
Paterson had been a framer of the Constitution and of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (as
one of New Jersey’s first Senators); in addition, he had been his state’s attorney
general and was a respected jurist who was engaged in revising New Jersey’s laws
while serving on the Court. 37 Many Federalists favored Paterson over Cushing,
including many in the Senate (who knew and respected Paterson as a former
colleague)—but Adams worried that, were he to bypass Cushing to nominate
Paterson, he would offend Cushing.38
No other sitting Associate Justice seemed a likely candidate for promotion to
Chief Justice, which simplified the conundrum somewhat. Yet, as Adams realized,
naming a sitting Justice such as Cushing or Paterson to succeed Ellsworth would
create more problems regarding judicial appointments. Promoting a sitting Justice
would require the appointment of a new Associate Justice to fill the resulting vacancy.
Would the Senate be able or willing to confirm two appointments to the Court in the
short time before its session ended? Indeed, would Adams be able to find a candidate
for the new vacancy on the Court should he name Cushing or Paterson Chief Justice?
And if by choosing Paterson he so offended Cushing that Cushing resigned from the
Court, Adams would have two vacancies to fill besides the Chief Justiceship.
While Adams pondered his options, Thomas Boylston Adams, his youngest son
and a newly-minted lawyer, wrote to him from Philadelphia to convey a message
36. Turner, supra note 2, at 150–51, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 46–47.
37.

On Paterson, see John E. O’Connor, William Paterson, Lawyer and Statesman 1745–1806
(1979); Daniel E. Degnan, S.J., William Paterson: Small States’ Nationalist, in Seriatim, supra note 12,
at 231–59; R.B. Bernstein, William Paterson: Conservative Revolutionary in an Age of Crisis, Garden
State Legacy (Dec. 2011), http://gardenstatelegacy.com/files/William_Paterson_A_Conservative_
Revolutionary_in_an_Age_of_Crisis_Bernstein_GSL14.pdf. See also the documentation of Paterson’s
appointment in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 87–93.

38. Turner, supra note 2, at 151 n.36, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 46 & n.36.
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from Jared Ingersoll, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania. Ingersoll
was a distinguished Federalist who had been a quiet delegate to the Federal
Convention of 1787, and was a recognized leader of the bar of the nation’s largest
city. Shaken by the electoral rout of 1800, Ingersoll wanted to resign his office rather
than await removal by the incoming Republican administration. Adams told his son
to ask Ingersoll to delay his resignation until at least March 3, 1801 (Adams’s last day
in office), while also instructing Thomas to sound out Ingersoll about his availability
for another appointment. Adams then awaited word whether Ingersoll would be
willing to join the Court as its newest Associate Justice, meaning that he would have
a candidate on hand to fill the vacancy created by promoting Cushing or Paterson.
Father and son exchanged letters for weeks thereafter, with the President pressing his
son for an answer and Thomas reporting with frustration that Ingersoll was unwilling
to commit himself.39
V. PRESIDENT ADAMS AND THE ONCE (AND FUTURE?) CHIEF JUSTICE JAY

Adams therefore proceeded on two tracks in the winter of 1800–1801. While
monitoring Thomas Boylston Adams’s struggle to extract a definite answer from
Ingersoll, he also looked outside the Court to find a plausible candidate for Chief
Justice, a course of action that would not require finding a second nominee to the
Court. Adams wanted not only a distinguished jurist, but a man who could unite the
fractious Federalists in the Senate behind his appointment. Adams therefore decided
to bring back to national politics a man who had worked with him to negotiate the
Treaty of Paris of 1783 that ended the American Revolution, a man who had been
the first Chief Justice of the United States and also had served as governor of New
York, and a man who could bring together the various factions of the Federalists in
his support: John Jay. Gifted with diplomatic skill, legal ability, and political stature,
Jay was fifty-five, ten years younger than Adams, and thus was likely to serve for
longer than Cushing could. And, with the second term of his governorship drawing
to a close, he might well be available to accept a well-paying, distinguished federal
post that he would be able to hold for the rest of his life.
Adams also knew, however, that there was no guarantee that Jay would accept
reappointment to the Court. Jay’s years of service under the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution had left him weary and frustrated. From 1784 through 1789,
Jay had served as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, having succeeded his fellow New
Yorker Robert R. Livingston. At that time, Jay had set as a condition of accepting
the post that Congress must return the seat of government to New York City, his
home town. Before this appointment, Jay had spent the early 1780s on diplomatic
missions in Spain and France; now he wanted to be close to his wife, Sarah Livingston
39.

Turner, supra note 2, at 147–49, reprinted in Preyer Essays, supra note 2, at 43–45. Once Adams named
Marshall to the Chief Justiceship, there was no longer the prospect of a further vacancy on the Supreme
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federal circuit court judgeships. Ingersoll ultimately declined. See Robert J. Lukens, Note, Jared
Ingersoll’s Rejection of Appointment as One of the Midnight Judges of 1801: Foolhardy or Farsighted?, 70
Temp. L. Rev. 189 (1997).
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Jay, and his children, in his home town of New York City—and Congress was so
desperate for a reliable Secretary of Foreign Affairs that it accepted his demand. Jay
found the Secretaryship vexing, especially when, in 1786, he had sought congressional
authorization to negotiate a commercial treaty with Spain by making a tactical
concession of American rights to gain access to the lower Mississippi River and the
port of New Orleans, then under Spanish control. Suspicious of his motives and
scenting bias on Jay’s part in favor of the commercial northeastern states, the delegates
from the five Southern states made clear that they would block any attempt to ratify
any treaty that Jay negotiated on his proposed terms. This debacle confirmed Jay’s
sour view of the Confederation and his commitment to national constitutional
reform, a position that he held throughout 1787 and 1788, during the framing and
adoption of the Constitution. Indeed, it was Jay’s shrewd, diplomatic efforts at the
New York ratifying convention in 1788, at least as much as the oratorical pyrotechnics
of his colleague Alexander Hamilton, that helped secure New York’s ratification of
the Constitution.40 Moreover, Jay’s Address to the People of the State of New-York proved
far more popular and effective as a pro-Constitution pamphlet than the two stout
volumes of essays known as The Federalist.
In 1789, President Washington offered Jay his choice of positions in the new
government. Rather than take the office of Secretary of State, the institutional
successor to the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, Jay accepted appointment as the
first Chief Justice of the United States. Again, however, Jay found his new post more
vexing than gratifying.
In 1795, after nearly six years as Chief Justice, Jay left the High Court, feeling
bitterness about his time there, and for good reason. As the first Justices of the new
Supreme Court, Jay and his colleagues were victims of widespread suspicion of efforts
to create an independent federal judiciary. The need to allay these suspicions strongly
influenced the creators of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The framers of the 1789 Act
created a system of lower federal courts dividing the nation into three judicial circuits.
Justices would ride from state to state, holding circuit courts in their assigned circuits,
sitting in each state’s circuit court with each state’s federal district judge. This system of
circuit-riding would give the Justices something to do while waiting for the new federal
judicial system to generate an appellate workload for the Supreme Court.41 These trial
courts were the workhorses of the federal judicial system, becoming the principal
means by which the federal government had direct contact with the American people.42
40. Richard B. Morris, John Jay and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in New York: A New Reading of
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Riding circuit, however, was onerous and sometimes potentially life-threatening.
Justice James Iredell, who was repeatedly assigned to the Southern Circuit, complained
that the assignment required him to travel 1500 miles twice a year over bad roads on
horseback. Iredell died suddenly in Edenton, North Carolina, on October 20, 1799, at
the age of forty-nine; later scholars have attributed his demise to the toll that circuitriding exacted on him.43 So, too, while riding circuit in the winter of 1800, Justice
Samuel Chase fell off his horse and nearly drowned as he tried to ford the Susquehanna
River.44 Jay and his colleagues made repeated attempts to lobby Congress and President
Washington for judicial reform, but Congress seemed indifferent to the Court’s
plight—a circumstance that infuriated the Justices and left Jay, in particular, with few
illusions about how little value anyone put on the federal judiciary.45
Jay and his brethren suffered from more than the burdens of circuit-riding. In
1798, the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution represented
an extraordinary rebuke to the Court. This amendment overturned perhaps the Jay
Court’s most important case interpreting the Constitution—Chisholm v. Georgia
(1793), which, by a vote of four to one, upheld the right of a citizen of one state to sue
another state in federal court without that state’s consent.46 The issue raised by
Chisholm might seem a technical matter of jurisdiction, but at the time it threatened
to create a tidal-wave of litigation against the states in federal courts on a variety of
grounds. The most threatening such ground was the prospect that former Loyalists,
now refugees in Canada or Great Britain, might sue states to recover lands confiscated
from them during the Revolution—lands that states had resold to enable more of
their citizens to own land and thereby to qualify for voting and holding office, as
well as to ease the demand for land. The threat that such lawsuits might destabilize
the states’ new economic, social, and political orders was so terrifying that such
leading Federalists as Alexander Hamilton had pledged during the ratification
controversy of 1787–1788 that the federal courts never would hear such cases. As
Justice James Iredell maintained in lonely, agitated dissent, Chisholm gave the lie to
those assurances. Within weeks of receiving news of the Court’s decision in Chisholm,
43.
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four states petitioned Congress to adopt such an amendment, and Congress lost no
time in acting on their demands. Although it is unclear when the states ratified the
amendment, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering declared it ratified in 1798. The
Eleventh Amendment not only overturned the Court’s decision in Chisholm, but did
so by declaring that the Constitution should not and could never be interpreted in
the way that Jay and all his colleagues, with the exception of Iredell, had read it: as
an insult of epic proportions.47
Nothing could be done to ease the pain of the rebuff to the Court embodied by
the Eleventh Amendment, but Adams hoped that pending legislation reshaping the
federal judiciary by abolishing circuit-riding might persuade Jay to accept
reappointment as Chief Justice. What became the Judiciary Act of 1801 was the
focus of heated debate in both houses of Congress; this statute would create new
federal circuit courts to handle appeals from the specialized district courts and to
deal with their own caseloads, leaving the Justices free to manage the Supreme
Court’s appellate caseload and the few categories of cases that they could hear in the
Court’s original jurisdiction. The bitterness of the debate raised worries about
whether Congress would pass the measure and send it to President Adams for his
signature before his term expired.48
Meanwhile, on December 18, 1800, with wary hope, Adams sent Jay’s name to the
Senate, which swiftly confirmed him the next day.49 Adams immediately sent word to
Jay of his appointment in a heartfelt letter assuring Jay that in the present turbulent
times, “nothing will cheer the hopes of the best men so much, as your acceptance of
this appointment. You have now a great opportunity to render a most signal service to
your Country. I therefore pray you most earnestly to consider of it seriously & accept
it.”50 Adams also waxed eloquent in praise of Jay’s talents and abilities, hoping perhaps
that such compliments would move Jay to return to the Court:
I had no permission from you to take this step but it appeared to me that
providence had thrown in my way an opportunity not only of marking to the
publick the spot where in my opinion the greatest mass of worth remained
collected in one individual but of furnishing my Country with the best
security its inhabitants afforded against the increasing dissolution of morals.51
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As he admitted in his letter, however, Adams had never asked Jay whether he
would accept reappointment as Chief Justice. Adams’s critics cite this oversight as an
example of his habit of making appointments and other decisions impulsively52—and
yet this was precisely the course of action that Washington had followed in January
1796 in naming Cushing as Chief Justice. Over the next two weeks, Adams pondered
what Jay would do; in the meantime, he continued to seek potential candidates to fill
a new vacancy on the Court should Jay decline and Adams have to return to his
previous plan of naming Cushing or Paterson to the Chief Justiceship. Another
consideration weighing on Adams was the fractious congressional debate over the
Judiciary Act of 1801; its fate might determine whether Adams would have to appoint
a sitting Justice to the Chief Justiceship or look outside the Court if Jay said no.53
On January 2, 1801, Jay wrote to Adams refusing his appointment; Adams
received the letter about two weeks later.54 Jay balanced between expressing warm
feelings for his old colleague and venting his dislike for how badly the nation was
treating its new court system. Calm, decisive, and icy-cold in his assessment of the
post offered to him, Jay made clear that he had no faith in efforts at judicial reform—
the argument that Adams had hoped might bring Jay around to accepting
reappointment to the Court. Jay reminded Adams that the Judiciary Act of 1789,
which created circuit-riding, was shaped more by “certain Prejudices and Sensibilities,
than . . . the great and obvious Principles of sound Policy.”55 He added that ten years
of hopes for reform “have not been realized; nor have we hitherto seen convincing
Indications of a Disposition in Congress to realize them.”56 Jay did not mention,
among the many slights that the judiciary received at congressional hands, the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, but he did not have to do so. Both men
recognized the amendment as a stinging blow to the Court.
Jay ended his letter with a blunt summation of his reasons for refusing his
appointment; his statement deserves extended quotation:
I left the Bench perfectly convinced that under a System so defective it would
not obtain the Energy, weight, and Dignity which are essential to its affording
due support to the national Government; nor acquire the public Confidence
and Respect which, as the last Resort of the Justice of the nation, it should
possess. Hence I am induced to doubt both the Propriety and the Expediency
of my returning to the Bench under the present System; especially as it would

52.
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give some Countenance to the neglect and indifference with which the opinions
and Remonstrances of the Judges on this important Subject have been treated.57

Perhaps realizing that he had been uncharacteristically undiplomatic, Jay
concluded his letter by acknowledging his sense of public obligation; at the same
time, he concluded, he could not overlook that “the state of my health removes every
doubt, it being clearly and decidedly incompetent to the fatigues incident to the
office.”58 Even in reference to an ostensibly private reason for refusing reappointment,
the New Yorker could not forbear pointing out the taxing effects of being Chief
Justice (including the ordeal of circuit-riding).
Even while awaiting Jay’s reply to news of his reappointment to the Chief
Justiceship, Adams half-expected him to decline, but he had confided in nobody, not
even his wife and closest political advisor, Abigail Adams, how likely it was that Jay
would refuse reappointment or what Adams might do in that case.59 The historical
record offers conflicting evidence of Adams’s thinking as he awaited Jay’s response.
There are some indications that he actually was returning to the previous option of
naming a sitting member of the Court to succeed Ellsworth and then naming a new
Justice to fill that vacancy, or accepting the idea floated in Congress, then in the
midst of drafting the Judiciary Act of 1801, that it would be wise to shrink the
Court’s membership to five, relieving Adams of the burden of making two
appointments to the Court—as well as leaving no vacancy for his successor to fill.
All the while, Adams was working side-by-side with Secretary of State John
Marshall—and taking Marshall’s measure.
VI.	PRESIDENT ADAMS AND CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL

As of January 1801, John Marshall had served as John Adams’s Secretary of State
for a little less than a year, but he had already won the President’s confidence and
liking. Marshall was born in Virginia in 1755 and, at the age of twenty, commanded
a unit of Virginia militia during the opening months of the Revolution. Starting his
military career as a lieutenant in a local regiment known as the Culpeper Minutemen,
he enlisted in the Continental Army and became first a lieutenant and then a captain
of the Eleventh Virginia Continental Regiment. Serving under George Washington
at Valley Forge, the young Marshall swiftly formed a deep admiration for his fellow
Virginian. After the war’s end, Marshall studied for the Virginia bar, including six
months of lectures by George Wythe at the College of William and Mary. In 1780,
Marshall received his law license, bearing the signature of Virginia’s governor,
Thomas Jefferson—a notable historical irony, in light of events some thirty years
later that would pit Marshall, then Chief Justice, against President Jefferson.60
57.
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Launching himself as an attorney, Marshall soon had a wide-ranging and varied
law practice. Like most other attorneys of his time, he focused on such issues as
property disputes, controversies over land titles, and will and estate contests. In 1788,
his strong support for reforming the general government led him to join the
Federalists in backing the proposed Constitution. Elected as a Federalist delegate
from Henrico County to Virginia’s ratifying convention in Richmond, he joined
forces with such leading Federalists as James Madison and George Wythe, speaking
with particular effectiveness in defense of the Constitution’s Article III, which
authorized an independent federal court system headed by “one Supreme Court.”61
Following the Constitution’s ratification, and despite the praise he received for his
efforts in the Virginia ratification contest, Marshall navigated increasingly troubled
political waters. Most Virginia politicians opposed the fiscal policies proposed and
advocated by Washington’s Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton; thus,
Marshall became more and more prominent among the slowly dwindling band of
Virginia’s Federalists—even though, in 1791, he chose to retire from public life to
practice law, speculate in western lands, and care for his ailing wife.
From 1791 to 1797, however, despite his intentions, Marshall found himself
shuttling once more between private and public life. The demands of his growing law
practice clashed with his political sympathies, for he often represented Virginia
debtors seeking to evade the claims of American and British creditors, or to defend
Virginia statutes easing debtors’ burdens in the face of the Constitution and national
treaties. In 1796, he argued his only case as an attorney before the U.S. Supreme
Court—Ware v. Hylton, which he lost decisively.62 In that case, Marshall sought to
defend a Virginia statute authorizing confiscation by the state of debts owed to British
subjects. Despite his efforts, which won admiration for his eloquence and his masterly
legal analysis of the questions presented, the Supreme Court struck down the statute
on which he and his client relied, holding that it violated the ban on such statutes by
the Treaty of Paris of 1783, and thus the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.
In the late 1790s, Marshall was returning to prominence as a Southern Federalist,
emerging as second only to Washington himself in Virginia. Indeed, as the Federalists
increasingly became a regional rather than a national political force (with its center of
gravity in New England), Marshall’s standing helped vault him into national
prominence. Nonetheless, in 1795 he turned down Washington’s offer to name him
Attorney General of the United States; in 1796, he again turned down another bid
by Washington to bring him into the administration, this time as American minister
to France; and in 1798, he declined appointment to the Supreme Court (to succeed
James Wilson, who had undergone a spectacular self-destruct under the twin
pressures of financial ruin and failing health). Instead, Marshall recommended that
Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (1916); see also Charles F. Hobson, The
Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law (1996); R. Kent Newmyer, John
Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court (2001); and Jean Edward Smith, John
Marshall: Definer of a Nation (1996).
61.

For a valuable discussion, see Robarge, supra note 60, at 106–12, and sources cited therein.

62. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
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President John Adams name his good friend Bushrod Washington, who was the
former President’s nephew—a recommendation that Adams followed. 63 (Later,
Justice Washington would repay the favor by asking Marshall to write the authorized
biography of George Washington.64)
In 1797, however, he did accept a federal appointment from President Adams.
When he was named, with Charles C. Pinckney and Elbridge Gerry, to undertake a
special diplomatic mission to ease tensions between the United States and France,
the appointment launched a vital episode in his life—cementing his national
reputation, bolstering his status as a Federalist, and, above all, commending him to
the attention of President Adams, a man not given to undue fondness for Virginians.
Marshall and his colleagues had barely arrived in France before they confronted
three French diplomats, who demanded bribes for themselves and other officials as
the price of negotiations. When the Americans indignantly refused, the mission
failed. Marshall returned home with the diplomats’ report documenting the French
demand for bribes, which President Adams then released with shrewd timing and
spectacular political effect. The Americans’ defense of their national honor against
French insults in the so-called XYZ Affair made Marshall a national hero. Following
his return to America, Marshall continued to rise within the Federalists’ fractious
ranks, esteemed by both High Federalists and Adams Federalists, yet unswerving in
his support for President Adams. Following the President’s purge of High Federalists
from his Cabinet in 1800, he first named Marshall Secretary of War and then
Secretary of State. Thus, when Adams had to deal with the conundrum of whom to
name to the Chief Justiceship of the United States, he had Marshall by his side.
In an autobiographical sketch written over twenty years later at the request of his
friend and colleague Justice Joseph Story, Marshall recalled what happened when
Adams received Jay’s letter refusing reappointment to the Court.65 On reading the
letter, Adams declared to Marshall, “Mr. Jay has declined his appointment.” Then he
asked, “Whom shall I nominate now?” Marshall suggested Paterson, aware that
most Federalist Senators leaned toward the New Jerseyan, but Adams dismissed the
idea “in a decided tone.” Adams then looked at Marshall and said, “I believe that I
must nominate you.” A surprised but gratified Marshall accepted Adams’s decision
to name him the nation’s highest ranking judge.
Adams’s choice of Marshall might look like one of those impulsive acts so often
denounced by Adams’s critics,66 but further examination of his choice makes clear
63. On Bushrod Washington, see James R. Stoner, Jr., Heir Apparent: Bushrod Washington and Federal Justice

in the Early Republic, in Seriatim, supra note 12, at 322–49.

64. Freeman, supra note 8, at 62–104. The original edition is John Marshall, The Life of George

Washington (Philadelphia, C.P. Wayne, 1804–1807) (five vols.). A modern reprint of an 1838 onevolume abridgment is John Marshall, The Life of George Washington: Special Edition for
Schools (Robert Faulkner & Paul Carress eds., 2000) (1838).

65.

See John Marshall, An Autobiographical Sketch (John Stokes Adams ed., 1937); 1 DHSC, supra
note 9, at 928. For the documentation of Marshall’s appointment, see 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 152–55.

66. Even the otherwise admiring John Patrick Diggins criticizes Adams for his erratic impulsiveness. John

Patrick Diggins, John Adams 10 (2004). Alexander Hamilton denounced Adams’s tendency to
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that he knew what he was doing, and that he chose well. Adams saw in Marshall a
man only forty-five years old, healthy and vigorous, unlike Ellsworth or Cushing,
and thus someone who would serve for a significant period as Chief Justice. Adams
also knew that Marshall was a skilled lawyer and veteran diplomat, like Jay—
qualities that a new Chief Justice could draw on in winning his colleagues’ loyalty
and support. Adams also valued Marshall’s popularity, rooted in his part in the XYZ
Affair that had ignited the quasi-war with France. Finally, as a man who had endured
much from subordinates and political allies whose loyalties were questionable, Adams
knew that Marshall was a Federalist loyal to him rather than to the High Federalists.67
The Senate received news of Adams’s nomination of Marshall with consternation.
Adams’s choice left many Senate Federalists angry and shaken; most of them had
backed Paterson and had assured him of their support. (Other Senators, disconcerted
by Marshall’s relative youth, even expressed the private opinion that Adams should
name himself Chief Justice.68) At first, some Senators who were enthusiasts for
Paterson debated with one another the chances of forcing the President to their point
of view by delaying or even rejecting Marshall’s nomination. But finally the Senators
realized that they could not reject Marshall without risking an even more offensive
appointment from Adams or risking that the new President, probably Thomas
Jefferson, would choose the next Chief Justice. In addition, the pressure to complete
the task of recasting the federal judiciary by enacting the Judiciary Act of 1801 made
such a battle with the President pointless and destructive. 69 So, despite their
grumbling, they confirmed Marshall. Thus it was John Marshall who swore in his
distant cousin, Thomas Jefferson, as President of the United States. And, ultimately
John Marshall proved to be John Adams’s most enduring legacy as President.
VII. CONCLUSION

This story of President John Adams’s dealings with four Chief Justices is tangled
and complex. It is a story, by turns, of the use of Justices as diplomats; of the politics
of judicial selection; of the need for institutional reform; of the effects on laws of
partisan strife; of the competing demands of public and private realms in a leading
politician’s struggle to chart his own course; and ultimately of the roundabout and at
times impulsive ways that Presidents establish their legacies and Supreme Court
Justices get the chance to achieve greatness.

decide issues on “Impulse and Caprice.” Ferling, supra note 4, at 397; Kurtz, supra note 5, at 100. See
also sources cited in note 52, supra.
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Consider, for example, a few counterfactual situations70: What might have
happened had Thomas Boylston Adams been able to give his father timely assurance
that Jared Ingersoll would accept appointment as an Associate Justice? Such assurance
might have led Adams to promote Cushing—or, had Cushing declined, Paterson—
to Chief Justice. Cushing as Chief Justice would have been a place-filling
appointment, given that the stresses of being Chief Justice might have sapped
Cushing’s strength so that he would have died even earlier than September 13, 1810
(the date of his actual death). Such a scenario would have given the eventual
Republican President, Thomas Jefferson, the chance to appoint a new Chief Justice—
perhaps William Johnson or Spencer Roane (often named as a candidate should
Jefferson have the chance to name a Chief Justice). Cushing also might have declined
Adams’s offer, repeating his conduct from 1796, in which case Adams might have
turned to Paterson, a choice in line with the expectations and hopes of most Federalist
Senators. Paterson, however, died on September 9, 1806, so he also would have been
a place-holding appointment, again giving Jefferson the chance to name a Chief
Justice to his liking.
In any event, had Adams promoted either Cushing or Paterson to the Chief
Justiceship and then named Ingersoll to fill the vacancy left by that promotion, we
might not have had the landmark Marshall Court decisions that form the spine of
any standard course in constitutional law. Nor might we have had Associate Justice
Joseph Story, whom President James Madison appointed to the Court in 1812 to
succeed Cushing after two previous nominees (Levi Lincoln, Jefferson’s Attorney
General, and the diplomat and former Massachusetts Senator John Quincy Adams)
had declined the appointment, and a third (Alexander Wolcott) had been rejected by
the Senate.71 In turn, not having been named to the Court, it is not clear whether
Story would have become the Dane Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School,
nor whether he would have reshaped American law with the remarkable series of
treatises on commercial and constitutional law growing out of his lectures at Harvard.
And what would American constitutional law, not to mention the Supreme
Court, have become under the leadership of Cushing or Paterson, and then of
Johnson or Roane? Would it have set out to vindicate and define federal power to
regulate interstate commerce, or to defend national supremacy over the states, as the
Court did under Chief Justice Marshall’s leadership? Further, in a question indicating
the frequent mingling of law and politics in the early Republic, would another Chief
Justice have engaged in Marshall’s effort to separate law and politics and thereby to
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protect the Court and the federal bench from the vicissitudes of political change?72
By contrast, had Marshall not been named to the Court, would he have been able to
rekindle and redirect the energies of the demoralized Federalists and prevent them
from dwindling into a purely sectional faction? Would the Federalists have found
new inspiration and energy under the political leadership that Marshall could have
offered them, perhaps even backing him for the presidency against Jefferson in 1804
or Madison in 1808 or 1812?
These counterfactual questions offer new confirmation of the truth of the oftquoted comment by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., when, in 1901, as chief justice of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, he spoke at a court ceremony marking
the centennial of Marshall’s appointment as Chief Justice:
A great man represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to vary
the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of his
greatness consists in his being there. I can no more separate John Marshall
from the fortunate circumstance that the appointment of Chief Justice fell to
John Adams, instead of to Jefferson a month later, and so gave it to a Federalist
and loose constructionist to start the workings of the Constitution, than I can
separate the black line through which he sent his electric fire at Fort Wagner
from Colonel Shaw.73

Thomas Boylston Adams’s failure, despite his best efforts to nail down Jared
Ingersoll’s candidacy for a seat on the Court, John Jay’s decision to forgo another
bruising stint of public service, and John Adams’s willingness to seize on John
Marshall’s availability all suggest that we must heed the lessons that Jim Simon
teaches in his work on constitutional history. We must acknowledge—and be grateful
for—the influence of the contingent and the unforeseen on the Supreme Court’s
long and tortuous path from institutional irrelevance to judicial pre-eminence.

72. For this view of Marshall, see William E. Nelson, M arbury v. M adison : The Origins and Legacy
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